Introduction
In an important paper by Stokey (1998) , a series of simple growth and pollution models to investigate the links between the limits to growth and industrial pollution was presented. In Stokey's analysis an optimizing representative agent determines saving and abatement decisions.
By adopting a CRRA utility function, she shows that along the balanced growth optimal path emissions fall if and only if the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption exceeds one. Neither the rate of economic growth nor the rate of growth of emissions depends on the time preference of the representative agent. Even the conditions of sustainability do not depend on the discount factor.
This property of Stokey's model is somewhat paradoxical in the light of the fact that discounting plays a crucial role in the economic-environmental modeling with long time horizons, and the present debate on discounting environmental benefits and costs is centered on the inconsistency of discounting with the philosophy of sustainability. To resolve this paradox, we introduce into Stokey's model the assumption of dual-rate discounting as applied by Yang (2003) .
According to the dual-rate discounting approach people have two rates of pure time preference -a consumption discount rate used to discount utility from goods consumption and an environmental discount rate used to discount utility from environmental quality (or disutility from pollution). The environmental discount rate is supposed to be lower than the consumption one. The idea of an environmental discount rate that is different from the consumption discount rate is also explored by Hasselman et al. (1997) , Horowitz (2002) and Almansa Sáez and Calatrava Requena (2007) .
It should be said that some authors (Tol (2005) and Weikard and Zhu (2005) ) see no reason why rates of pure time preference should be different for different types of goods. They try to show formally that for purposes of cost-benefit analysis dual-rate discounting and the classical approach are equivalent.
We are not going to join the debate, but notice that in a framework of a growth model with a representative agents the environmental discount rate reflects social tastes, whereas the consumption discount rate reflects personal tastes. For ethical reasons, people may really prefer the use of lower discount rates to evaluate societal goals and objectives, even while possessing a personal high time preference rate. There is some empirical evidence indicating that the consumption discount rate and the environmental discount rate are different. For example, Lumeley (1997) reveals that Philippines upland farmers may be adopting soil conservation for ethical reasons in spite of their high individual discount rates. Taylor et al. (2003) found out that implicit discount rates are different for forest benefits of distinct nature, namely timber and recreation. Using an experimental methodology, Gintis (2000) and Farrugia (2010) arrive at the conclusion that the intertemporal preferences of individuals vary between private and environmental projects.
We consider a discrete time version of Stokey's model with dual-rate discounting. We prove the existence of a sustainable balanced growth optimal path and show that the long-run rate of economic growth is increasing in the proportion between the consumption and the environmental discount factors, whereas the rate at which pollution decreases is decreasing in this proportion.
Potential output F t at time t is given by the Cobb-Douglas production function:
where K t is the stock of fully depreciating capital and A t the total factor productivity growing at an exogenously given rate g > 0:
Potential output F t and final output Y t available for consumption and investment are related by
where z t is the technique of production. It is determined endogenously. Aggregate emissions X t are given by
Output Y t is available for consumption C t and the stock of capital at next time:
The objective function of the central planner is
where
It is convenient to eliminate z t and F t . To do this we can rewrite (1)- (2) as follows:
Thus, given K 0 > 0, the social planner's problem is
s.t.
This solution is called a balanced optimal path if for some g K > −1 and g X > −1 and for all t = 0, 1, ...,
If, moreover, g K > 0 and g X ≤ 0, it is called a sustainable balanced optimal path.
Let
Now we can prove our main result. The following theorem reads that under some conditions on the relationship between the two discount factors a sustainable balanced optimal path exists, the long-run rate of economic growth is increasing in the proportion between the consumption and the environmental discount factors, and the rate at which emissions decrease is decreasing in this proportion.
Theorem. Suppose that
then for any sufficiently high A 0 a sustainable balanced optimal path exists. On this path,
(1−α)κ 1 +κ 2 − 1,
Proof. For a sustainable balanced optimal path, constraint (6) is not binding. Therefore, to prove the theorem it is sufficient to show that for any (6) .
be a solution to the problem (3)-(5) at K 0 = K * 0 and let λ t and µ t be the costate variables corresponding to constraints (4) and (5) respectively. Necessary first-order conditions for this problem are:
More specifically they can be rewritten as follows:
∞ t=0 satisfies (7), then there are g λ > −1 and g µ > −1 such that, for all t = 0, 1, ...,
It is not difficult to check that
and (β 1 /β 2 )(1 + g)
Therefore
Let us now prove that if 0 < σ < 1, then
and if σ > 1, then
Indeed, it follows from (15) that
(1−α)κ 1 +κ 2 .
Therefore,
Hence,
Since β 2 /β 1 > 1, it follows that σ > 1 implies (17) and 0 < σ < 1 implies (16). We can summarize by formulating Lemma 1. If 0 < σ < 1, then
be a sequence satisfying (4)- (5) and
We have for all t = 0, 1, . . .
To complete the proof it is sufficient to notice that from (13), (14) and g X ≤ 0 we obtain
and hence λ T K * T +1 → 0 as T → ∞. Suppose that A 0 > 0 is given. On the one hand, it is clear that if se-
and (µ t ) ∞ t=0 satisfy (7), (8)- (11) 
is a solution to the problem (3)- (5) 
is the solution to the system of equations
From (18) we obtain
and from (19) C = ξY, 
